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LIMITS OF PRIVATE LAW:
ENRICHING LEGAL DOGMATICS
Marc A. Loth*

I.

INTRODUCTION: A LEGAL PROBLEM

A.

Wrongful Life

In 2005, the Dutch Supreme Court decided a wrongful life case.'
During her pregnancy, a woman consulted her midwife because there
were two cases of handicaps in her husband's family, due to a
chromosomal disorder. The midwife did not think it necessary to
investigate the matter any further. This was later considered a
professional failure with dramatic effects. When born, baby Kelly turned
out to have serious mental and physical handicaps from which she
suffered severely. The parents claimed damages-both on their own
accord and in the name of Kelly-and their claims were sustained by
both the appeal court and the Supreme Court. 2 The Supreme Court not
only considered the strictly legal issues but also considered moral and
pragmatic arguments that had been put forward against such so-called
"wrongful life claims."
First, there is the moral opposition that sustaining these claims
violates the principle regarding the dignity of human life, since it
acknowledges that having not been born is preferable to living in a
*

Dean and Professor dr. of jurisprudence and legal theory, School of Law, Erasmus

University Rotterdam. This paper was delivered as the first Erasmus Lecture at Hofstra University
School of Law, New York, on 21 February 2007 and is a contribution to the research project
"Limits of law" of the University of Leuven, Belgium, under the supervision of professors Erik
Claes, Wouter Devroe, and Bert Keirsblick. The line of reasoning is borrowed from an earlier
publication (M.A. Loth, A.M.P. Gaakeer, Meesterlijk recht, over recht, rechtswetenschap en
juristerij,Den Haag: Boom juridische uitgevers 2005, derde druk).
1. Academisch Ziekenhuis Leiden/Verweerders, Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [HR]
[Supreme Court of the Netherlands], 18 maart 2005, NJ 606 (Neth.).
2. See id.
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condition like hers. Second, there is the pragmatic argument that
sustaining claims like this will tempt doctors to practice "defensive
medicine" to avoid serious risk. Both arguments were carefully
examined by the Court and subsequently rejected.3 What is the Supreme
Court in fact doing here? Is it calling out or explaining the law to us? Or
is it exceeding its limits by elaborating on principles and policies, taking
into account the moral grounds and the possible consequences of the
ruling itself? In both directions the question arises: What constitutes the
limits of private law?
B. Law Without Limits?
The reasoning of the Supreme Court in this case exemplifies a
pattern that is not uncommon in difficult cases, at least not in our part of
the world. In first instance it reasons within the context of the accepted
sources of law, in this case the relevant provisions of the civil code in an
accepted interpretation. In difficult cases, though, the result of this
approach is not completely satisfactory, since the decision is
underdetermined by the law. On the one hand, the relevant rules and
precedents do not offer sufficient guidance for the decision, while on the
other hand the decision reached cannot be sufficiently justified by the
relevant rules and precedents. In the light of the relevant facts the law
shows certain "gaps," as it were, which have to be filled in by other
factors than the accepted sources of law. Therefore, the Supreme Court
appeals, in second instance, to principles and policies to fill in these
gaps, by making and justifying a decision for the case at hand. Its
reasoning can therefore be considered as a two step line of reasoning,
although the steps cannot always be clearly identified or separated.
This two step line of reasoning, however, displays some specific
characteristics about the limits of law. First, it shows us that the law has
what H.L.A. Hart has termed an "open texture," which means that its
rules, precedents or whatever standard of behavior will always, in the
end, prove to be indeterminate, as a result of the general nature of the
language used and the unpredictability of the social reality in which they
are applied. 4 Rules are not self-applying, as Wittgenstein noted, and their
application is therefore intrinsically mixed with the facts of the case or,
in other words, its context. 5 This is the meaning of the old Roman

3.
4.
5.
trans., 3d

See id.
See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-36 (2d ed. 1994).
See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 39-41 (G.E.M. Anscombe
ed. 1967).
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adagium ius in causa positum; the law is, in the end, given with the
facts.6 The two steps line of reasoning displays the open texture of law,
but it also shows us something of the more fundamental nature of law.
The contextual gaps of the law are often filled in by principles and
policies, by values and practices, by idealistic and pragmatic notions.
This leads me to an important distinction of three different
dimensions of law, namely the positivistic dimension (accepted sources
of law), the idealistic dimension ("de lege fenrenda," law as it ought to
be) and the pragmatic dimension ("law in action," as it turns out to be).
In a perfect world, perhaps, these dimensions would coincide. We do not
live in a perfect world, however, and we are brought up with the tensions
between "law as it is" and "law as it ought to be," on the one hand, and
between "law in the books" and "law in action" on the other. Moralists
and realists have made a business of exploiting these tensions as a
domain of research. Lawyers, judges, and courts tend to exploit them in
finding an acceptable solution for a specific case. First, they appeal to
the positivistic dimension to decide a case, but in difficult cases they
often appeal to the other dimensions as well (as they did in the wrongful
life case). Law then, seems to encompass more than we are inclined to
think, at first sight. What, then, are its limits? And how are we to find
them?
These are highly disputed questions in legal theory. Three Grand
Old Theories of law have haunted us for many centuries now. Legal
positivism acknowledges the existence of idealistic and pragmatic
dimensions, but considers them to extend beyond the limits of the law. It
defines law by its positivistic dimension, the black letter law of our first
intuition.7 Natural law theory, on the contrary, takes the idealistic
dimension to be the defining characteristic element of law, 8 the positive
norms being only shadows of this real norm leading a somewhat
undetermined nature "in the omnipresent brooding of the sky"
(paraphrasing Oliver Wendell Holmes). 9 Legal realism, lastly, considers
the law to be the facts and practices that constitute legal norms and that
precede and follow from black letter law. These three Grand Old
Theories each take different characteristics of law to be defining: the
positivistic, the idealistic, and the pragmatic dimension, respectively. As
6.

E.J.H. Schrage, Unjust Enrichment: A Historical and Comparative Overview, in UNJUST

1 (E.J.H. Schrage ed., 2001).
See HART, supra note 4, at 185-86.
See id.
See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The
law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky .... ).

ENRICHMENT AND THE LAW OF CONTRACT 1,

7.
8.
9.
common
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the German postwar legal philosopher Gustav Radbruch has shown
convincingly, these dimensions are not to be considered as different
conceptions of law but are inherent tensions within the concept of law.
The different dimensions of law serve different values, namely legal
certainty, justice, and purpose, respectively. The values can never be
realized completely at the same time. In law, as elsewhere, inherent
values rarely coincide and mostly conflict with each other. The best one
can do in legal practice is to look for and find an equilibrium, which
0
exemplifies an optimal combination of these values.'
What the Grand Old Theories do share, in all their differences, is
the mistaken view that the concept of law and thus its limits are the
result of definition. In my view, instead of defining the concept of law,
we would do better to investigate the phenomena that present themselves
as law (for example in the wrongful life case). Paraphrasing
Wittgenstein one could say:
Consider the phenomena we call ["law"]

. ..

What is common to them

all? Don't say: "There must be something common, or they would not
be called ['law']"-but look and see whether there is anything
common to all.-For if you look at them you will not see something
that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and of whole
series of them at that.... I can think of no better expression to
characterize these similarities than "family resemblances":... [law]
forms a family.I
If we follow Wittgenstein's suggestion then-and don't define the
law, but look and investigate it-what do we see and find? Is the law
demarcated along tight and neat boundaries, reflecting ontological
differences, as the Grand Old Theories picture it? Or does it resemble a
patchwork of family resemblances of positivistic, idealistic and realistic
dimensions, as the wrongful life case suggests? Or is law without limits
whatsoever? What does the wrongful life case actually show and teach
us; what can we learn from it?

II. SOLUTIONS FROM LEGAL THEORY
A.

Law in Context

In his study Law in Context, William Twining tells us an anecdote
from the days he lectured on private law at the University of Khartoum
10. GUSTAV RADBRUCH, RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 164-70 (1975).
11. WITTGENSTEIN,supra note 5, at 31-32.
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in Sudan. In his lecture he discussed a case in which a visitor of a zoo
had been feeding a camel and had been bitten by the camel. The question
of law was, of course, whether the zoo was liable for the damage caused.
At that time a student raised his hand. The lecturer, happy with a
question, interrupted his lecture to experience the following anti-climax.
"Please, sir", the student asked, "why was the camel in the zoo?"' 2 This
question puts everything in place again. Why was the camel in the zoo,
while they are freely walking around in Sudan? What is the use of
lecturing common law to an audience to whom the facts of the case are
beyond comprehension? Twining's conclusion is that law cannot be
properly understood outside the context in which it is developed and
learned, and he therefore pleads for an approach of law "[to broaden] the
study of law from within."'1 3 In such a contextualistic approach there are
no standard recipes in law. Lawyers should look for the demands of the
circumstances of the case "proston kairon" in the words of Aristotle t4 and adjust their responses accordingly.
In my opinion Twining has a strong case, because the suggested
approach is not one that is arbitrarily chosen, but is itself the result of
relevant developments in law and its study. Let me try to explain this,
starting with the contextualisation of law itself Posner has named this
phenomenon "the decline of law as an autonomous discipline," by which
he refers to the blurring of the sharp boundaries between law, politics,
and morality. 15 Let me illustrate this development with examples from
the European context, starting with the demarcation between law and
politics. Under the influence of the doctrine of the separation of powers
this demarcation was rather strict until the end of the nineteenth century.
The content of law was determined by politics, while its shape and
enforcement were by and large considered to be the result of doctrinal
law. With the emerging welfare state, this clear division blurred because
the law became an instrument of politics to change society, while at the
same time the judiciary developed new legal standards for politics. As a
result of both tendencies the domain of public law has grown, while its
content became more and more the subject of political controversy. The
best example from the Dutch context is offered by the emerging
principles of good governance in administrative law, such as the
prohibition of the misuse of power and of detournement de pouvoir.
12.

WILLIAM TWINING, LAW IN CONTEXT: ENLARGING A DISCIPLINE 26-28 (1997).

13.

Seeid. at 13-14.

14.

ARISTOTLE, ETHICANICOMACHEA 106 (Kalias 1997).

15.

Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-87, 100

HARV. L. REv. 761 (1987).
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Though these principles supply additional legal standards for
government, their content is seriously disputed. Only recently have
politicians complained that government is hindered by the fact that these
principles of good governance bring the administrative judiciary too
close to the business of politics.
The relation between private law and morality shows similar
developments. Until the late nineteenth century law and morality were
strictly separated, the law enforcing minimal standards of behavior,
leaving the aspirations and ideals to critical morality. From the twentieth
century onwards the boundaries were blurred in two opposite directions:
the moralization of private law, and the legalization of morality. On the
one hand, unwritten norms of a moral character got hold of the central
doctrines of tort, contract, and property. Most of the classics of the
Dutch Supreme Court of the twentieth century belong to this category.
On the other hand, more and more social relationships were brought
under the influence of the law, such as those between teacher and
student, parents and children, and doctors and patients (wrongful life is
an example).1 6 Again, the domain of private law has grown, but its
norms are more and more of a social cum moral nature and therefore
more disputed.
A telling case from recent years suggests that this development has
come to an end. The case was about an accident by which a boy named
Jeffrey drowned under unrevealed circumstances after his swimming
therapy in a hospital pool. At the time he was under the supervision of
his mother and a hospital therapist, but neither was there at the time. The
parents did not claim money, however, but asked the court for a
declaration that the hospital was liable, because that would help them
cope with their loss. The parents filed a claim against the hospital for the
recognition of their rights, but not for the compensation of damage.
Should the court give such a moral declaratory ruling, even if it is
conceded that the hospital is liable for the accident? Should the judge
become a psychological therapist, instead of the priest or the
psychiatrist? The Dutch Supreme Court denied the claim, because of a
lack of a legitimate interest of the claimants.' 7 And that was the end of it.
These examples-however roughly sketched-show that there is
every reason "to broaden the study of law from within" (as Twining has
16. See, e.g., Academisch Ziekenhuis Leiden/Verweerders, Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [HR]
[Supreme Court of the Netherlands], 18 maart 2005, NJ 606 (Neth.).
17. Sylvia Johanna Van Aalten/De Vereniging voor Christelijk Wetensehappelijk Onderwijs,
Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [HR] [Supreme Court of the Netherlands], 9 oktober 1998, NJ 853
(Neth.).
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named it). 18 Law cannot be understood properly-as perhaps in the late

nineteenth century-without reference to politics and morals. Legal
discourse has been extended far beyond the traditional boundaries and
overlaps the political and the moral discourse. As a matter of fact, we do
regularly appeal in legal discourse to moral principles and pragmatic
arguments, besides traditional legal sources. In that sense, law is a metadiscourse, a discourse on other discourses. We could introduce the
metaphor of demarcation by saying that the traditional legal sources
constitute the inner limits of legal discourse, while principles and
policies mark the outer limits. Most lawyers stay most of the time within
the inner limits, appealing to statutes, precedents, or customary law. In
difficult cases, however, when the traditional sources are exhausted, we
do in fact appeal to moral and political arguments; not per se, however,
but as legal arguments. Although we regularly appeal to other discourses
than law, in law we do subject them to the limitations of legal discourse.
After all, legal concepts determine what can be said (and thought) in
law.
As a result, we have to beware of two possible risks in this regard.
On the one hand, there is the risk of losing sight of these limitations.
This is the pitfall of those lawyers who tend to forget the limitations of
legal discourse, who trespass the boundaries of legal discourse
unknowingly, and commit the sins of sheer activism or moralism. They
do speak in law-not as lawyers though, but as activists or moralists. On
the other hand, however, we run the risk of not exhausting the
possibilities because we tend to stay within the inner limits of legal
discourse. This is the pitfall of the lawyers we tend to accuse of
legalism, formalism, or black letter law. Again, they do speak in law,
and they even speak as lawyers, but they do not speak as open-minded
lawyers. I will return to some examples of these pitfalls later on. For
now, it is enough to conclude that the contextual approach of law holds
the middle between these two opposites. What are the consequences for
the study of law? This question will be addressed in Part II.B.
B. The InterdisciplinaryStudy of Law
One of the reasons "to broaden the study of law from within,"' 9 as
Twining suggested and we investigated, is the contextualization of law
itself. There is another good reason for this approach, however, and that
is the contextualisation of the study of law (not of law itself). There are,
18. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
19. Id.
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of course, several ways to drive this point home. In legal theory it is an
accepted proposition that the application of law, or the identification of a
legal proposition, presupposes an interpretation of law.20 Apart from the
facts, legal disputes are mostly disputes on different interpretations of
the relevant law.2 ' In difficult cases, different interpretations of law are
supported by both parties, each struggling for recognition as the
authoritative interpretation. These diverging interpretations are not
always the result of mistake or bad faith (although they sometimes are),
but of different interests and perspectives of the parties, lawyers and
judges involved. Interpretation is therefore intrinsically interwoven with
the argumentation of different positions. 2
Legal reasoning is essentially a practical syllogism, where a case is
confronted with arguments deduced from experience which results in a
provisional solution. As Stephen Toulmin has shown us, this line of
reasoning is always defeasible, that is, it can always be annulled by
adding new information.2 3 In this sense it differs from theoretical
reasoning, which indeed has the potential to lead to certain and objective
conclusions (given the premises). As a domain of practical reason, law
misses this comfortable certainty, leaving its practitioners to find their
way in daily practice with no other means than experience and practical
wisdom.
As we saw in the wrongful life case, judges do appeal in their
reasoning to principles and policies, beyond the appeal to more
traditional legal sources. And as we argued before, these appeals are
subject to the possibilities and limitations of legal discourse. If these
observations hold, then this has implications for the nature of legal
knowledge. We tend to consider "thinking like a lawyer" as deliberating
on positive law, that is, the traditional legal sources. If we take the
suggestion "to broaden the study of law from within" seriously,
however, then this is not enough and the legal student should come to
learn also to think like a sociologist, an economist, or a psychologist
(compare with the Jeffrey case). 24 Or, perhaps, we should say that
"thinking like a lawyer" includes thinking like all these other
professionals.
20. See Ken Kress, Modern Jurisprudence, Postmodern Jurisprudence, and Truth, 95 MICH.
L. REV. 1871, 1910-11 (1997) (reviewing DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH (1996)).
21. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 1-30 (1986).
22. See PAUL RICOEUR, THE JUST 109-26 (David Pellauer trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000)
(1995).
23. See STEPHEN EDELSTON TOULMIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT 107-13, 118-22, 141-45

(1958).
24.

See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
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A lawyer who understands law in its context will never restrict
herself to the strictly legal domain, but will integrate sociological,
economic, or psychological expertise. The professional knowledge of a
lawyer extends beyond the strictly legal and will overlap with other
disciplines. Also in this epistemological sense, law is a discourse on
other discourses. In his daily work a lawyer is, at the same time, to some
extent an engineer, or accountant, etc. Not in the sense that he can
replace their expertise, for example as an expert witness, but in the sense
that he is capable of analyzing the problem into its different aspects and
of redressing them on their own merits. Again, just like in speaking the
legal language, we should realize that this knowledge is applied in a
legal context and therefore subject to the limitations of law and legal
discourse. At the end of the day, these elements have to be integrated in
one legal judgment. One could even say, perhaps, that it is the particular
knowledge of the lawyer to integrate all these different kinds of
expertise in a legal judgment. Similarly, a legal scholar who understands
law in its context will not restrict herself to legal dogmatics, in the strict
sense, but will include history, literature, anthropology, etc. A contextual
approach is necessarily an inclusive one, resulting in the
interdisciplinary study of law.
In a similar tone, James Boyd White has discussed the nature of the
interdisciplinary study of law when he combatted "doctrine in a
vacuum" in legal education and pleaded for an interdisciplinary
and
training. 25 Such a training is not one of "law and sociology,"
26 or "law
"history," White argues, but one of "law as each of these."
This is a different view of interdisciplinary work from the usual
models, for we are not interested in translating findings or even
methods from one field to another; rather, in this kind of work each of
the disciplines would be looked at as I suggest law should be looked at:
as a language, an27activity, and with an eye both to its special resources
and to its limits.
Put differently, "thinking like a lawyer" implies thinking like all the
others and training in the first should therefore encompass the last. Not
by imitating the sociologist, economist or psychologist, but by being
aware of the sociological, economic, and psychological elements in law.

25. See JAMES BOYD WHITE, FROM EXPECTATION TO EXPERIENCE: ESSAYS ON LAW AND
LEGAL EDUCATION 8-24 (1999).

26. Id. at 22.
27. Id.
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28
After all, Twining wanted "to broaden the study of law from within"
(not from outside). A contextualist approach in law, therefore, implies
more than just adding some social circumstances in our thinking and
acting in law; it presupposes the capacity to switch perspectives, in the
full awareness of the possibilities and limitations of each of the positions
chosen (first and foremost, the legal one). Contextualism is necessarily
connected with perspectivism. There is no such thing as a "view from
nowhere" (in the words of Thomas Nagel), 29 but only an observation
from the viewpoint of the observer. Every observation presupposes a
blind spot, which is the context which cannot be observed from the
standpoint taken. One has to step aside to observe the blind spot, thus
creating a new one.

C. Alternative Theories of PrivateLaw
In this contextualistic approach of private law, its limits then are
fluid and constantly changing, depending on context and perspective.
Are there any alternatives available? There are two I can think of, and I
name them "back to dogmatics" and "forward to policies" respectively. I
hope to show that they represent extremes that should be avoided, since
they commit the sins of underexploiting legal discourse and trespassing
the boundaries of legal discourse respectively, as discussed before. 30 The
position taken here represents a middle of the road position that, at least
in my view, avoids the pitfalls of the alternatives while combining their
advantages.
First, then, the program of "back to dogmatics," for which I take the
views of Weinrib as exemplary. Weinrib is concerned with the
understanding of private law, his claim being that private law is to be
understood in its own terms (and not in terms of its purpose). In
Weinrib's view, "private law is a self-understanding enterprise," that is,
it is "simultaneously explanandum and explanans, both an object and a
mode of understanding." 31 Thus understood, the idea of private law is
considered to be a synthesis of three theses, namely formalism (the
understanding of private law through its structure), corrective justice (the
specification of this structure), and a Kantian notion of rights (the moral
standpoint immanent in this structure).32 In Weinrib's view, private law

28. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
29. THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE (1986).
30. See supratext accompanying notes 18-19.
31. ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 14 (1995).

32. Id. at 18-19.
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is autonomous, and he rejects any "law and.. ." approach as resulting in
either reductionism or an infinite regress. Though he acknowledges that
law can be understood in terms of its history, sociology or economy, the
understanding of law in its own terms-legal
dogmatics in its purest
33
form-is the only legitimate approach of law.
On the other hand, there is the "forward to policies" program, for
which I take Richard Posner's ideas to be exemplary. Posner offers a
pragmatist program that is "practical, instrumental, forward-looking,
activist, empirical, skeptical, anti-dogmatic, [and] experimental. 34
Posner's pragmatism is quite the opposite of Weinrib's formalism. For
Posner, his law-and-economics program introduces in law the ethics of
scientific inquiry, because "economics is the instrumental science par
excellence. 35 Modem economics offers the theoretical framework for
the empirical research in law. The economic analysis of law therefore
denies law's autonomy; legal rules are viewed in instrumental terms.
Both law and legal rules are analyzed in terms of means to achieve
certain ends, be that wealth maximization or something else. Its moral
concern is to serve the welfare of the non-legal community. Law itself is
considered to be a mechanism for social control, to be replaced by more
effective ones, as soon as they are available. Legal dogmatics in its
current form is pretentious, prejudiced and uninformed, Posner
concludes, and should be replaced by a more pragmatic program.36
This is not the time and place to redress both programs on their own
merits, but I do want to make the point that the proposed "law in
context" approach holds middle floor between both opposites. In the
most abstract terms, the comparison can be framed like this. Like
Weinrib's program, the "law in context" approach acknowledges a
certain autonomy for law and legal dogmatics, though it does take into
account the increasing importance of mutual influences between law and
its contexts. There is no reason whatsoever to ban approaches that focus
on law in context, though we should not forget that external influences
are integrated into law. That is why we preferred the expression "law as
(etcetera)" above "law and (etcetera)," since the former expresses this
need for integration in law better than the latter.37
Like Posner's program, ours acknowledges that law cannot be
understood properly without taking its context into account (economics
33.
34.

See id. at 17-18.
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 11 (1995).

35. Id. at 15.
36. Seeid. at21.
37. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
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included), though we should not reduce law to economics. Not only
because there are other legitimate perspectives, but also because law
cannot be understood properly in purely instrumental terms since it has
and expresses values of its own. For that reason law cannot be made
instrumental to any political purpose whatsoever; some purposes are
simply contradictory to law's own values such as the principles of legal
certainty, justice and purpose, distinguished by Radbruch.38
"Law in context" then is preferable to "back to dogmatics" and
"forward to policies." First, because it holds the promise of better law
than the alternatives. It is my conviction that contextualists do better as
lawyers than formalists and activists, both with respect to the
development of law and the judgment of cases. Second, and more
important in this context, because it provides us with a better
understanding of law than the accounts of Weinrib and Posner do. Law
is neither a mere instrument for policy, nor an island in itself; it is a
social practice with semi-autonomous language, methods, and values.
The understanding of law then should not be merely reductionist or selfreferring-as in the accounts of Posner and Weinrib-but should give
insight into its relations with the different contexts in which it is
developed and applied. "Law in context" offers just that.
III.

A.

PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS

The Rise and Decline of Modernism

We have already seen that the "law in context" approach is also
more fitting for recent developments in law than its alternatives. Now I
would like to show that the interdisciplinary study of law also fits better
with recent developments in philosophy. For this purpose, I want to
sketch the bigger picture of the history of ideas that underpins our
discussion and that is often referred to as modernism. For Stephen
Toulmin, the rise and decline of modernism can be sketched as a
pendulum which brings our present day post-modernism back to the
intellectual heritage of sixteenth century Renaissance.3 9 In between is the
epoch of modernism which lasted from the end of the seventeenth
century to the end of the nineteenth century and that is characterized by

38. See Eric F. Hinton, Balancing Justice, Expediency, and Legal Certainty: The Free
Movement of Goods in the European Union, 5 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DISP. RESOL. 1, 7-8
(1997).
39. STEPHEN TOULMIN, COSMOPOLIS: THE HIDDEN AGENDA OF MODERNITY 22-28 (1990).
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what John Dewey has named "the quest for certainty., 40 This phrase was
used by Dewey to express that man, looking for certainty, is inclined to
prefer theoretical reason over practical reason.4 1 Theoretical reason,
then, is the domain of thought, universality, certainty, stability, and
rationality, while practical reason is the domain of action, contingency,
uncertainty, flexibility, and reasonableness.
One of the purposes of Dewey's pragmatism was to restore the
balance between the domains of thought and action, which meant a
restoration of the Aristotelean insight that the degree of exactness of a
discipline or activity is dependent on its subject. 42 "[D]ifferent methods
for different topics," as Toulmin summarized, which means a return to
the "World of Where and When, a world in which everything we say
refers to a particular time and place, without claiming any abstract,
universal validity., 43 This return to contextualism at the beginning of the
twentieth century was a symptom of the decline of modernism, the roots
of which go back to sixteenth century Renaissance.
The rise of modernism started around 1650, when the Peace Treaty
of Westphalia ended the religious wars by dividing Europe into fixed
nation states. At the same time scientists like Newton changed the
picture of the universe beyond recognition, describing it as a clock in
which every event was connected through lawlike causal
generalizations. Starting with Descartes, philosophy came into the grip
of three dreams: the dream of a unified science (Newton), a unified
method (Descartes), and a unified language (Leibniz). This "quest for
certainty" also had its impact on social thinking. Political philosophy
changed from the art of politics from Machiavelli to the picture of
society as a construction sketched by the social contract philosophers
(Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke).
Ethics developed from the art of casuistry it had been since
Aristotle-acting "pros ton kairon, 4 4 as the circumstances demand-to
the quest for a categorical imperative in the work of Kant. Even legal
thinking did not escape the demands of the time. The legal humanistic
perspective on Roman law as a series of texts gave way for the idea of

40.

JOHN DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY: A STUDY OF THE RELATION OF KNOWLEDGE

AND ACTION (1929).
41. See id. at 21.
42. ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA, supra note 14.
43. STEPHEN TOULMIN, RETURN TO REASON 96, 192 (2001).
44. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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Roman law as "ratio scripta," which is exemplified in the work of
Grotius-On the Law of War and Peace).45
In general, the rise of modernism shows a shift from practical to
theoretical reason, from humanism to rationalism, from rhetoric to logic.
In its heyday, modernist thinking can be characterized by two distinct,
but connected ideas. First, there was a picture of language as a
representation of the world, presupposing a correspondence between
word and world. Wittgenstein's "picture theory of meaning" was one of
the most important prerequisites of objective knowledge. Second,
scientific knowledge was considered to be in need of indisputable
justification, whether in self-evident axioms (rationalism) or in objective
observations (empiricism). This ideal of objective knowledge could not
be realized in the social sciences, which from then on were considered to
be suspect, soft, and unreliable. Law, of course, shared in this judgment.
At the end of the nineteenth century the tide turned. The nation
states eroded and became involved again in great wars. New scientists
like Einstein and Bohr developed theories that seriously put into
question the picture of the universe as an organized clockwork.
Wittgenstein in his later work demolished the picture theory of meaning,
leaving us with the idea of language as a variety of games, played
according to different rules. Logical positivism was the last attempt to
find a foundation for objective knowledge, but it failed. "The totality of
our so-called knowledge or beliefs," Willard Van Orman Quine wrote,
"from the most casual matters of geography and history to the
profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and
logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along
the edges."4 6 The German philosopher Hans Albert showed why the
search for objective knowledge had to end in an infinite regress, a circle,
or a dogma; a trilemma named after the famous Baron Von
Miinchhausen who was not able to pull himself up from the swamp by
his own wig. 47 The modernist project appeared to be an illusion, and the
French philosopher Lyotard proclaimed the end of "the Great Stories of
Enlightenment., 48 The question remains, of course, where this leaves us.
The rise and decline of modernity has been marked by poets. At the
beginning of modernity in 1611, John Donne wrote in his poem An
anatomy of the world the lines: "Tis all in peeces, all cohaerence
45.
46.
OF VIEW
47.
48.

See HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (2004).
WILLIAM VAN ORMAN QUINE, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in FROM A LOGICAL POINT
20, 42 (1953).
HANS ALBERT, TREATISE ON CRITICAL REASON 16-21 (Mary Varney Rorty trans., 1985).
See TOULMIN, supra note 39, at 172.
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gone., 49 At the end of modernity, shortly after the First World War,
50
Yeats wrote: "Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold.,
Postmodernism started, as modernism did, with a widespread feeling of
crisis, both in science and society. Some philosophers supported this
feeling with a conviction that-now nothing is determined-"anything
goes" (Feyerabend).5'
Toulmin, on the contrary, pleads for a restoration of the humanist
ideals of sixteenth century Renaissance. 52 The values of humanity,
tolerance and reasonableness seem perfectly fit to countervail the
diversity, ambiguity and uncertainty of our days. The end of the Great
Stories of Enlightenment marks, in his view, a return to the practical
wisdom, modesty and skeptical tolerance of the Renaissance or-put
differently-a humanization of modernism. 53 This is an appealing
program with consequences for philosophy (a return to practical
philosophy), for science (different standards for different disciplines),
and for politics (a moderated pragmatism as antidote for absolutist
thinking, from whatever origin or source). In any case, it shifts the
pendulum back from theoretical reason to practical reason, from
rationality to humanity, and from logic to rhetoric. The circle is round,
we are back to where we started. But what does all this mean for the
study of law?
B. PrivateLaw as a Battlefield
Private law belongs-together with medicine and theology-to the
eldest disciplines. In fact, the history of the university started in the
eleventh century in Bologna with the rediscovery and the study of the
Corpus Juris Civilis of Justinianus. From then onwards, private law has
always been-with variations in focus and methods-the study of
authoritative texts to solve cases. Private lawyers pretty much stuck to
their methods, when science and technology emerged in the seventeenth
century. Since the eighteenth century, the study of society began to
evolve and resulted in a process of "Ausdifferenzierung" of the various
social sciences out of the shadow of the law. Economics emerged from
49. Id. at 64-65.
50. Id. at 66.
51. See id. at 198 (explaining that Feyerabend "bids farewell" to "scientific rationalism," i.e.,.
"logical rationality").

52. Id. at 180 ("As matters now stand, our need to reappropriate the reasonable and
tolerant... legacy of humanism is more urgent than our need to preserve the systematic and
perfectionist ...legacy of the exact sciences .... ").
53. Id. at 180-86 (tracing the humanization of Modernity).
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the administration of government, political economy, and a new focus
on the empirical effects of the law (Marx). Anthropology took its
starting point in the study of law and legal practice in newly discovered
cultures (Maine). The founding fathers of sociology took an interest in
the process of modernization in which law (as religion) did play an
important role (Durkheim, Weber). It is noteworthy that all the pioneers
mentioned were lawyers by education; it was a new way of looking at
law and society that started these new disciplines.
Next, it was a process of specialization, stimulated by external
factors, that facilitated the development into separate, autonomous
disciplines. This process of specialization has, of course, advantages and
disadvantages. On the one hand, it focuses the necessary attention to
make any progress whatsoever, on whatsoever; on the other hand it
forces one to bracket off different procedures, methods or perspectives,
thus stimulating selective blindness. "[S]elective attention is one thing,"
Toulmin writes, however, "blinders are another.,

54

I will try to illustrate

this later. For now, it suffices to conclude that the demarcation between
legal dogmatics and the other social sciences is a contingent matter.
As a result of these developments, the study of private law is a
battlefield. On the surface it has developed rather quietly since the days
of its birth, the main development being the transition from a Ius
Commune to national codified private law in the early nineteenth century
with the emergence of the nation states, and now with their erosion back
to a European private law. Beneath the surface, however, there is a lot
more going on. First, the separation between the natural sciences and the
humanities-"The Two Cultures," in the words of C.P. Snow 55-left its
traces in private law, too. These traces were not only in topics of
substantive law (like causation), but also in method. Traditional legal
dogmatics has found its home in the humanities, but from time to time
ideals and devices are borrowed from the sciences. I mention a few
examples without any pretense of completeness: Langdell's legal
57
formalism, 56 Von Savigny's Begriffsjurisprudenz, Kelsen's Reine

Rechtslehre,58 Hart's
54.
55.

analytical jurisprudence.59 These and other

TOULMIN, supra note 43, at 42-43.
See generally C.P. SNOW, THE Two CULTURES (1993) (discussing how far apart

intellectuals in the Natural Sciences and the Humanities have strayed).
56. See generallyThomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REv. 1 (1983).
57. See generally JH Dalhuisen, Legal Orders and Their Manifestation: The Operation of the
International Commercial and Financial Legal Order and Its Lex Mercatoria, 24 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 129 (2006).
58. See generally HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans., 1967).
59. See generally HART, supra note 4.
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movements in (private) law shared an inspiration in science, which
manifested itself in the ideals of objective knowledge, a rational method,
order and system in law, and a strict separation between law and politics,
or law and morals. 60 As such they were nearly always followed by a
reaction in the form of a turn to society: legal formalism by Holmes's
legal realism, Begriffsjurisprudenz by Interessenjurisprudenz, the
analytical movement by the critical legal studies, etcetera. 6 1 Again we hit
upon a pendulum, this one located in private law,. attracting it
alternatively between system and society, logic and experience,
technique and policy. This movement had a large impact, not only on the
study of private law, but also on the practice and content of private law
itself.
Next, there is the differentiation in different disciplines which has
not left the study of private law untouched. Paradoxically, the early
differentiation of the social sciences from law confirmed the core of the
study of private law in its dogmatic, practice-oriented approach of law. It
stimulated a professional ideology that legal dogmatics sticks to positive
law and its application in cases, leaving the rest out. Let me try to
explain this, explicating some of the "blinders" I mentioned before. With
regard to its subject matter, legal dogmatics has been from the start a
study of authoritative texts, taking these texts as the sources of positive
law. In limiting itself to texts, legal dogmatics has left practice to the
social sciences. To fill in the gap between the study of law and the social
sciences in the late twentieth century bridging (sub) disciplines emerged,
such as sociology of law, anthropology of law, psychology of law,
etcetera. A peculiar development if one realizes that sociology,
anthropology, psychology and the others emerged from the study of law
in the first place. However, this restriction to texts is one blinder of legal
dogmatics, but not the only one.
With regard to the purpose of the study of law, I already mentioned
that it has always been dedicated to cases, using authoritative texts as the
loci for arguments in legal dispute. As such, it operates between law and
case, text and context, logic and experience. Legal dogmatics has thus
always played an important social role, though at the expense of the
formation of theory which was left for other disciplines. With regard to
the method, legal dogmatics has always stayed close to text-analytical
methods-whether the scholastic method, philology, or hermeneuticsthus leaving the use of empirical methods to other disciplines. These
60.
61.

K. LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 1-165 (1979).
See generally ALAN HUNT, THE SOCIOLOGICAL MOVEMENT IN LAW (1978).
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limitations make us aware that legal dogmatics has always been a
limited enterprise: it restricted itself to positive law for pleading and
solving cases, by using analytical methods on authoritative texts. This is
62
legal dogmatics, in the proper sense. As such, it has left empirical
research legal practice and the formation of theory to other social
(sub)sciences. Legal dogmatics has thus both defined law and its
context, restricting itself to the former, and leaving the latter to other
disciplines. Again, the study of law and thereby the definition of law
itself appear to be a contingent matter.
Legal dogmatics has its own reasons, of course, to suggest
differently. The authority of its expertise is underlined by the suggestion
that its subject matter, purpose and method are somehow "given," thus
resulting in the exclusion of different approaches to the study of law. As
mentioned before, this focus is beneficial for the growth of knowledge
within the given paradigm, but this is achieved at the cost of bracketing
off different approaches and perspectives. In their daily work, however,
legal scholars find themselves often referring to the demands of
"practice," which is an often used and sometimes misused expression.
Sometimes it refers to the principles or policies involved, at other times
to the particular preferences of the scholar, and again at other times to
(aspects of) the context of the case. At this point my plea for a "law in
context" approach comes in, not as a radical alternative for the existing
practice of legal dogmatics, but as a way of conceptualizing the appeal
to "practice." Does it refer to a calculation of consequences, to the social
circumstances of parties involved, to the principles and policies lurking
in the background of positive law, or to some other relevant context?
This question can only be answered by changing perspective-from
legal dogmatics to the economics, sociology, psychology or history of
law-not to end up finding ourselves in a different discipline, but to
integrate this perspective in our own legal discourse. In its daily life, law
is-besides everything else-economics, sociology, psychology, history,
literature, etcetera. Why then do we not integrate these perspectives in
the study of law? The interdisciplinary study of law, properly
understood, is meant to improve the study of law and thus to enhance
our understanding of the law, nothing more nor less. What does that
mean for the private lawyer's expertise? We will address this question in
the Part III.C.

62.

LARENZ, supra note 60, at 204.
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C. The Private Lawyer's Expertise
In private law, as in other disciplines, our picture of professional
knowledge has long been dictated by the model of technical rationality.
According to this model, professional knowledge is nothing more, or
less for that matter, than the application of scientific knowledge, like a
kind of technology. This model fits positivistic premises, of course,
since it rests on the characteristic positivist separation of means and
ends, facts and values. In law, it served the purpose of the separation of
"law as it is" and "law as it ought to be," the latter being the domain of
the politician or the moralist, and the former being that of the lawyer. In
legal theory, it has found expression in the movements of legalism,
formalism, the case method of Langdell, and Von Savigny's
Begriffsjurisprudenz. In practice, however, the model of technical
rationality served a specific need for the justification of professional
practice.
The rise of positivism in the nineteenth century demarcated a shift
from a "legitimacy of character" to a "legitimacy of technique." The
privileges of a professional were no longer justified by his social
position, honor, and the authority and character of the whole of its
practitioners (their courage, wisdom, responsibility), but by the
application of objective and rational scientific techniques.63 Weber has
framed this shift in the social domain as one from charismatic authority
(depending on the person of the authority) to authority on legal and
rational grounds (depending on the methods used).64
Since the decline of positivism, however, this model of professional
practice is discredited, both for intellectual and social reasons. Socially,
we have lost appreciation of technocrats who instrumentally apply their
scientific expertise for whatever purposes. The twentieth century offers
plenty of examples to justify this discontent. Intellectually, we have
come to a different and more complex understanding of what it takes to
participate in professional practice. Let me try to express that
understanding by comparing the expertise of a private lawyer with that
of a private legal scholar. Three differences come into view. The first is
that the body of professional knowledge of lawyers practicing in the
field of private law is organized differently, not according to the
principle of logical coherence, but according to that of practical utility.
63. See ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF
EXPERT LABOR 184-95 (1988).
64. See MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 328 (A.M.

Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., 1947) for a description of these types of authority.
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She is not so much interested in the system of private law, of course, as
well as its use-based organization.
Second, the professional knowledge of the private lawyer has a
larger component of practical knowledge than that of the private law
scholar, while the latter has a larger component of theoretical
knowledge. On the difference between theoretical and practical
knowledge, "knowing that" and "knowing how," "epist~m" and
"phron~sis" (as Aristotle would say), there is a vast amount of literature
that I will not discuss here.65 For now, it suffices to say that the first is
conceptual, propositional knowledge, while the latter is of a perceptual
and dispositional nature. For that reason, practical knowledge is partly
"personal knowledge," as Michael Polanyi would have it, or "tacit
knowledge." 66 A practitioner usually knows more than she can tell. From
both the first and the second difference, it follows that the professional
knowledge of the private lawyer has a larger moral component than that
of the private legal scholar. The practitioner knows better what to do
under what circumstances, not only from a legal point of view but also
from a moral point of view. In fact, it is part of her expertise to know
what to do in private law, as it is the scholar's expertise to fit and
explain this solution in terms of the system of private law. These
differences are there, not to be neglected, though they do not deny the
connections between both types of expertise, as the private lawyer and
the private legal scholar would confirm. What they do deny, though, is
that the relation between both types of knowing is simply one of
application, as the model of technical rationality would have it.
The private lawyer's expertise, then, is far more inclusive than we
are inclined to think. It encompasses knowledge and competences, of a
legal, moral or some other kind, both explicit and implicit belonging to
the lawyers' repertoire. In a case like the wrongful life case, for
example, the Dutch Supreme Court considered not only the legal issues,
but also the moral grounds of the different options, as well as their
expected consequences. 6 7 This includes moral wisdom, legal
interpretation, financial calculation of the consequences, and a feeling of
empathy with the parties, especially the parents of baby Kelly. In doing
so, the judges appeal to different contexts of the case, bringing their
moral, economic, psychological and other experiences to the job. To get
65.

See, e.g., GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 27-32 (1963).

66. See generally MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL
PHILOSOPHY (1958) (exploring the nature of "Personal Knowledge" as the "fusion" between
personal and objective understanding).
67. See supra Part I.A.
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these different contexts into view the judge has to change perspective,
subsequently taking a legal, moral, economic or other perspective, and
eventually integrating them into one decision that fits and justifies the
law at stake. Now compare this way of proceeding with the alternatives:
excluding non-legal elements from the decision, and following policies
of one's own preference. In my view, the contextualistic approach
promises more informed, and therefore better law.
Now let us switch to the legal scholar. For the private law scholar
who is trying to make sense of the ruling, there is not much difference.
When she tries to understand the ruling, she can of course neglect all the
expertise that does not fit into the model of legal dogmatics as a selfsufficient enterprise (as Weinrib's scholar would do).68 In my view, she
would make poor sense of the ruling, and she would not do justice to the
court. On the other hand, she can try to reconstruct the ruling as an
attempt to realize some predetermined extra-legal policy or goal (as
Posner's legal scholar would do). 69 Again, I think she would
misunderstand the ruling and would not do justice to the court. Instead
of both these options, she could also try to review the ruling from
different perspectives, alternatively taking the moral, financial,
psychological and legal aspects into account. In other words, she could
try to study the ruling in different contexts, thus bringing different kinds
of expertise to the job. At the end of the day she will attempt to integrate
these different kinds of expertise in a coherent understanding of the case,
expressing her views on what the court has ruled and what this ruling
attributes to the law. Of course, she may fail in doing so, but at least she
has tried to come to a better understanding of the law than the available
alternatives can provide.
IV.

A.

BACK TO LAW

Integrity in Law, and in Lawyers, Too

So far we have argued the need for switching perspectives by
taking different contexts into account, both in the practice and in the
study of law. This approach holds the promise of better informed law as
well as a more comprehensive understanding of legal practice. We
mention in passing that to fulfill this promise it is not enough to compare
these different perspectives; we really have to integrate them into our

68. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
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practice or understanding of the law. For James Boyd White this means
that we have to put them together in something new that changes our
understanding of the composite parts. "As lawyers we cannot simply
accept the conclusions of others; we must make them our own, and to do
that we must move out of the legal culture and into the other one.",70 For
White, this process is very similar to that of the translation of texts, not
as a simple substitution of words, but in the sense of creating a new
discourse of meaning.7 1
In law itself this process is exemplified by the way the expertise of
expert witnesses is integrated in legal deliberation and judgment.
Forensic and psychiatric expertise is transformed into a legal judgment,
but not without mutual influence and transformation. In the study of law,
bridge-disciplines like the sociology or psychology of law illustrate the
same point; their best practices are not to be considered as an application
of sociological or psychological theory to law, nor as mere examples of
legal imperialism, but as a contribution to new ways of looking, talking,
and knowing.
In cases of integration of non-legal knowledge it is of course harder
to pass Ronald Dworkin's integrity-test than when we integrate just
another legal case. Law as integrity requires an interpretive attitude-a
specific case is interpreted as the best possible continuation of legal
practice, thus fitting as well as justifying the practice as a whole. For
legal cases this means that they are interpreted as an exemplification of
the principles and values lurking behind legal rules and precedents. The
question is then: What is the best realization of these principles and
values in this case? The answer to this question may, as we know, even
contradict accepted interpretations of legal rules and precedents (contra
72

legem).

Now, what happens if we try to integrate originally "non-legal"
knowledge into the body of legal knowledge, as in the examples given?
The metaphor of translation sets us on the right track, since it makes us
aware that intellectual integration is a matter of bridging cultures, that is,
of languages, methods, and values. Take the example of a legal scholar
and a scientist engaging in interdisciplinary research. They may be
tempted to conceptualize the obstacles they encounter as differences in
idiom, method, and values. The gap between their cultures almost seems
unbridgeable then. Idioms cannot be translated without loss of meaning,
70. JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL
CRITICISM 14 (1990).

71. See id.
72. See DWORKIN, supra note 21, at225-76 (discussing "law as integrity").
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different methods determine a different outlook, and both are in the end
reducible to diverging beliefs and attitudes. Is there no way, then, to
escape this fragmentation in our disciplines?
There is, and in my view it can be phrased like this. The crucial step
is getting to learn to recognize the foreign elements in our own culture
and thus (mirrorwise) the characteristic elements in our own culture.
What does the law do with forensic or scientific evidence? And what
does that teach us about the legal outlook itself? How does the law
conceptualize human relations, and what can we conclude about legal
concepts? How do we strike the balance between the demands of safety
and traditional liberty rights, and what does it tell us about these rights?
How does the Supreme Court in the ruling of baby Kelly appeal to the
moral principle of the dignity of human life? And what does that tell us
about the relationship between law and morality? Such questions really
draw our attention to interdisciplinary research, since they redress the
foundations of our own discipline as well. In law and its study, as in
daily life, the communication with other practices cannot but influence
our own practices. This is what intellectual integration is all about-a
slow and tough development of our own culture in the continuous
contact with others, thereby opening new horizons, and at the same time
closing others.
The attempt to remedy fragmentation can be taken one step further,
as a struggle against the fragmentation in ourselves. For this, we should
start to consider diverging bodies of knowledge or conceptual
frameworks as different communities thinking and talking. In the words
of James Boyd White: "We should conceive of the relevant world as a
world of people speaking to each other across their discourses, out of
their languages, out of their communities of knowledge and expertise,
and speaking as people seeking to be whole. We should try to write that
way ourselves. 7 3 Engaging in interdisciplinary research entails
communication with representatives of other disciplines, getting to know
their way of speaking and thinking, and thus (again, mirrorwise) getting
to know ourselves, as lawyers. As such it exemplifies the old Socratic
wisdom in modem disguise: know thyself, as a lawyer.
Self-knowledge cannot but serve a therapeutic purpose as well. The
interdisciplinary study of law is not only a remedy for the fragmentation
in law and our understanding of it; it is also a remedy for the
fragmentation in ourselves. Changing perspective draws from different
sources in us, restoring our blinders, fighting professional deformation
73.

WHITE, supra note 70, at 20.
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and leaving us as richer and more competent lawyers-not only, and
perhaps not even primarily, because of our expertise, but at least as
much because of our imagination. The continuous contact with different
perspectives and other disciplines therefore not only makes us better
lawyers, but perhaps even better persons. After all, integrity
characterizes not only legal systems, but also people.
B.

Wrongful Life Re-Addressed

Let us, finally, re-address the wrongful life case with which we
started. In light of what has been said thus far, it can be considered to be
a serious attempt to integrate a moral perspective into the legal one,
since it explicitly appeals to the principle of the dignity of human life.
As such it deserves our praise. Faced with the moral nature of the issue
at stake, the Dutch Supreme Court is not satisfied with taking the safe
road, that is, an appeal to the legal sources. The Court apparently wants
to address the issue also on its own merits, thus trying to contribute to a
public debate about a controversial matter. The Court chooses for itself a
specific ethos, as a moral guide in a pluralistic society. Of course the
members of the Court would never admit this, but it suggests the
ambition to play a social role like a "philosopher-king" in the sense
distinguished by Plato.7 4 The question is whether the judiciary is
equipped to fulfill the function of a moral compass in matters of
substantial justice in a morally divided society. It may well be, as
Sunstein remarks, that: "Like all of us, judges have limited time and
capacities, and like almost all of us, judges are not trained as
philosophers. 75
Has the attempt of the Supreme Court to integrate a moral
perspective into its ruling in the case of baby Kelly not been successful
then? In my opinion, the answer is negative. The Supreme Court
undertook to investigate whether or not sustaining the claim for
compensation of the parents of baby Kelly (both on their own accord and
in the name of Kelly) would constitute a violation of the principle of the
dignity of human life. The Supreme Court addresses this question not
less than three times-in the context of its squashing of several defenses

74. See Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REv. 1077,
1097 (2004).
75. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME

COURT 249 (1999).
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of the defendants-showing a gradual inclining integration of this
argument in the motivation of its ruling.76
Let us analyze the argument closer. First, the Court states that the
implicit recognition of the birth of a handicapped child as "damage"-in
establishing a causal relation between the fault of the midwife and the
damage of the claimants-does not imply any judgment whatsoever on
the value of that child as a person or his or her existence. The argument
is not yet integrated in the motivation here; it is more or less added as a
loose remark, an obiter dictum. Second, the Court states that sustaining
the claim for immaterial damage of the parents-which is the decision of
the Court in this context-does not imply that the child is a source of
grief for them, but rests exclusively on the judgment that the fault of the
midwife infringes fundamental rights of the parents. The Court seems to
suggest a specific reading of its own decision here-we should see it as
a consequence of the fault, not as a judgment on the meaning of the life
of the child. The argument is therefore better integrated here, than in its
first use. Even more integrated is the third occasion of use, when the
Supreme Court deals with the defense that the damage cannot be
determined, since if the fault would not have been committed, baby
Kelly would not have been born at all. The Court rejects this defense on
the legal ground that the damage should be estimated in a case like this.
Sustaining this claim does not in any way imply that the existence of
Kelly should be valued lower than her non-existence, the Court argues,
but rests on the recognition of the unlawfulness of the acts of the
midwife and the hospital. Holding them liable does not infringe Kelly's
dignity, the Court concludes, but, on the contrary, facilitates her
ability-as far as money ever can-to lead a better life.77 Here the
argument is most fully integrated, because the Court finally provides a
reason why the principle of human dignity is not infringed. But is it a
good reason?
I do not think so. Although it looks plausible enough-at first sight
it even looks like a truism-it changes the nature of the argument it
seeks to refute. First, it addresses not so much human dignity in an
abstract sense-as it was put forward by the opponents-but the dignity
of this specific existence, the life of baby Kelly. Next, human dignity
does not function any longer as a ground for the judgment-as it was
used by the Bundesverfassungsgericht ("Die Verpflichtung aller
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staatlichen Gewalt, jedem Menschen in seinem Dasein un seiner selbst
willen zu achten... verbietet es, die Unterhaltsplicht fiir ein Kind als
Schaden zu begreifen")-but as a goal of the ruling (the possibilities for
Kelly to lead a better life). As a result, the appeal to human dignity
transformed from an argument of principle to a pragmatic argument. 78 In
short, the Supreme Court did succeed in integrating this moral argument
in its ruling, but not without a fundamental transformation of its nature.
Is this a serious flaw? I think it is, for two reasons. First, it misses the
point of the argument of the opponents. Nobody in his right mind will
deny that compensation for damage will put baby Kelly in a better
position to lead a better life, but that was not the argument of the
opponents. Their argument was that doing this will infringe the principle
of the dignity of better life, and this still holds good. 7 9 Besides, the
argument of the Supreme Court justifies too much. The proposition that
compensation for damage will put the victim in a better position to lead
a human life is valid for almost each medical liability claim. In fact, the
Court confines itself to a policy of victim protection. 0
V.

CONCLUSION

Starting with the ruling of the Dutch Supreme Court in the
wrongful life case we asked ourselves the question: What constitutes the
limits of private law? Since there are no fixed limits anymore, as the
Grand Old Theories presuppose, the practice of law nowadays shows us
a patchwork of characteristics or family resemblances, in different
combinations in changing circumstances. The wrongful life case is just
one example of a difficult case, in which the Supreme Court explicitly
appeals to a moral principle and empirical effects to justify its ruling
(besides the traditional appeal to legal sources). As such, it is a perfect
illustration of the way the positivistic, idealistic, and pragmatic
dimensions of private law interrelate.
What specific legal theory then offers the best account of the
current practice of private law? In this Article it is argued that the "law
78.

See generally P.S. Atiyah, Professor of English Law, From Principles to Pragmatism:

Changes in the Function of the Judicial Process and the Law, Inaugural Lecture delivered before the
University of Oxford (Feb. 17, 1978), in P.S. ATIYAH, FROM PRINCIPLES TO PRAGMATISM (1978)

(discussing the movement from principle to pragmatism in the law).
79. Academisch Ziekenhuis Leiden/Verweerders, Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [HR]
[Supreme Court of the Netherlands], 18 maart 2005, NJ 606 (Neth.).
80. The line of reasoning followed here is borrowed from an earlier publication. See M.A.
Loth, "Engaged in a search for justice," over grenzeloze aansprakelijkheid en de moeizame
integratie van een moreel principe, in ONRECHTMATIGE LEVEN? OPSTELLEN NAAR AANLEIDING
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in context" approach offers the best possible theory, both in terms of fit
and in terms of justification of current legal practice. First, it does justice
to the most prominent developments in law itself in the twentieth
century, which can be characterized as a "contextualization" of the legal
order (by which we refer to the blurring distinctions between law,
politics, and morality). Second, it seems a perfectly natural consequence
of the developments in the study of law, which have resulted in a
prominent position for the interdisciplinary study of law. Third, both
seem perfectly natural consequences of more general, philosophical
developments, as our sketch of the rise and decline of modernism
attempted to show. In all respects, "law in context" seems preferable to
the most likely altematives-"back to dogmatics" and "forward to
policies" respectively. I have tried to present "law in context" as a
middle ground between both alternatives, combining their virtues while
avoiding their vices. Perhaps both alternatives can be considered as
reminiscent of a surpassed positivistic ideology, but the argumentation
of that hypothesis would need more attention.
The question, then, is how legal dogmatics-itself the product of
contingent developments-can be enriched by the "law in context"
approach. In the most general terms, the recipe is twofold. First, we must
keep an open eye for the contextuality of law and legal phenomena and
be ready to give the contextual dimension of law its due. In legal
practice this is stimulated by the prominence of the facts and the training
of legal practitioners in their dealing with them. Their expertise contains
a good deal of practical wisdom and a strong hold on moral attitudes,
which is constantly triggered and strengthened. No practitioner in her
right mind would deny, in principle or in practice, the contextuality of
law, unless she is distorted by some legal theory such as Langdell's legal
formalism, Von Savigny's Begriffsjurisprudenz, or Kelsen's Reine
Rechtslehre.
In legal dogmatics, though, it is much harder to keep an open eye
for the contextuality of law. Legal scholars deal differently with the law
and are more subject to methodological schools and convictions. Here
my second device applies. Legal scholars should do better in
interdisciplinary research, not as an escape to the application of the
results or methods of other disciplines in the domain of law, but as a way
of changing perspective to grasp otherwise unnoticed aspects of the
practice under research. This is not the "law and. . ." approach that is
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viewed critically by so many, but a "law as. . ." approach that James
Boyd White has addressed.8 1
Interdisciplinary research entails both a broadening of the horizon
as well as an intellectual integration of the results. From this perspective
we have re-addressed the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of
baby Kelly. The integration of a moral argumentation-though at first
sight most promising-turned out to be less than a success upon closer
analysis. The Court ended up surrendering to a policy of victim
protection (a perfect exemplification of the "forward to policies"
approach). The reason is that it unconditionally placed the decision in
the service of the humanity of the life to be lived by Kelly. There are
other techniques, though, that can avoid this pitfall. The Court could, for
example, have restricted its ruling to this specific case, or it could have
used specific legal concepts as intermediary for moral considerations.
The technique of integration deserves more attention than received in
this Article. The same goes for the techniques of interdisciplinary
research in legal dogmatics, as a way of enriching the study of law.
There is gold in those hills, but we have not yet sufficiently explored
them.82
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